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Abstract: We present a threat assessment algorithm for driver assistance systems in which
mathematical vehicle and driver models are used to explicitly account for the vehicle and driver
behavior. For the application considered in this paper, requirements that the vehicle stays on
the road while operating in a stable operating region are expressed as constraints on the vehicle
states which need to be satisfied over a finite time horizon. The threat assessment problem is
then formulated as a constraint satisfaction problem, solved through interval-based techniques
considering bounded uncertainty in the measurements. Experimental results demonstrate the
algorithms ability to detect unsafe operation in advance.
Keywords: Semi-Autonomous Vehicles, Active Safety, Constraint Satisfaction Problems,
Bounded Uncertainty, Intervals.
1. INTRODUCTION
The introduction of electronic stability control systems in
passenger vehicles has contributed significantly to the re-
duction of fatal and severe traffic accidents, specially those
involving vehicles unintentionally leaving the road due
to loss of control, Ferguson (2007). Unintended roadway
departures however still account for the highest share of
traffic related fatalities, Najm et al. (2003); LeBlanc et al.
(2006), and are thus still a highly significant problem.
Currently, a wide range of driver assistance systems, which
also reduce unintended roadway departures are being in-
troduced in passenger cars. Curve speed warning systems
e.g. utilize sensor information about the oncoming road
and warn drivers if they are about to enter a curve too fast
LeBlanc et al. (2006). By giving the driver the opportunity
to reduce speed in advance, the curve speed warning sys-
tem thus reduces the risk of losing control in the oncoming
curve, Ali et al. (2009). Lane guidance systems are another
type of driver assistance system which also contributes in
reducing unintended roadway departures. Lane guidance
systems warn or assist the driver through a steering in-
tervention upon crossing a lane marking, Eidehall (2007),
and can, in contrast to electronic stability control systems,
be efficient in situations where the driver departs the road
due to drowsiness or distraction.
A common problem in such safety oriented driver assis-
tance systems is to determine in which situations drivers
need assistance. On one hand, such systems need to de-
tect critical situations and adequately assist the driver
when necessary. On the other hand, alerts or interventions
which drivers consider unnecessary, contribute negatively
to drivers confidence in the systems and it is therefore
crucial that false alerts are always avoided, Ali and Sjo¨berg
(2009). In many of the lane guidance systems proposed in
the literature this aspect is given little or no attention,
while focus is instead on the vehicle control in case of
an intervention. In this paper, the process of determining
whether an intervention is required is referred to as threat
assessment. A review of proposed lane guidance systems
and threat assessment methods in the literature can be
found in Ali (2010).
The focus of this manuscript is on finding reliable and com-
putationally efficient threat assessment methods for driver
assistance systems. In particular we start from the method
presented in Falcone et al. (2010) where mathematical
vehicle and driver models are used to explicitly account
for the vehicle and driver behavior. The requirements
that the vehicle stays on the road while operating in a
stable operating region are expressed as constraints on the
vehicle states which need to be satisfied over a finite time
horizon. The threat assessment problem is then formulated
as a constraint satisfaction problem and solved through
reachability analysis for linear systems.
We present a preliminary study, evaluating the potential
of the approximative interval-based consistency techniques
in solving this problem. Interval-based consistency tech-
niques have been implemented and applied in several
different domains, such as model-based fault detection
and diagnosis, robust control, and robotics, Gelso (2009);
Jaulin et al. (2001). These techniques are particularly
beneficial for handling uncertainties associated with e.g.
modeling and measurement errors. In addition, the inter-
val based methods can be used to obtain approximative
solutions to nonconvex constraint satisfaction problems,
enabling the possibility to extend the present method with
nonlinear models and constraints. Compared to previous
work, we account for uncertainties in the state measure-
ment and show that we obtain reliable results, with low
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Fig. 1. Vehicle modeling notation.
computational burden. The method is validated using ex-
perimental data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the mathematical models used in the threat
assessment algorithm to describe the vehicle and driver
behavior. In Section 3, the threat assessment problem
is stated as a constraint satisfaction problem. Section 4
introduces the fundamental concepts of interval analysis
and the interval-based consistency techniques used to
solve the constraint satisfaction problem. The proposed
algorithm for the threat assessment problem is presented
in Section 5. Section 6 analyzes the experimental results.
Finally, Section 7 discusses the conclusions and some
directions for future work.
2. MATHEMATICAL MODELS
In this section, we present the mathematical models used
in the threat assessment algorithm to account for the
vehicle and driver behavior.
2.1 Vehicle model
To describe the vehicle motion within the lane, we use a
standard single-track vehicle model Rajamani (2006),
mv˙y = −mvxψ˙ + 2
[
Fyf + Fyr
]
, (1a)
Jzψ¨ = 2[lfFyf − lrFyr ], (1b)
e˙ψ = ψ˙ − ψ˙d, (1c)
e˙y = vy + vxeψ, (1d)
where, m and Jz denote the vehicle mass and yaw inertia,
respectively, Fyf , Fyr are the lateral tire forces at the front
and rear axles, respectively, and the rest of the symbols are
defined in Figure 1.
The lateral tire forces are calculated as,
Fy i = −Ciαi, i ∈ {f, r}, (2)
with Ci, as cornering stiffness coefficients at the two axles
and αi, tire slip angles which, assuming small angles, are
computed as,
αf =
vy + lf ψ˙
vx
− δ, (3a)
αr =
vy − lrψ˙
vx
, (3b)
where δ denotes the steering angle at the front wheel.
Remark 1. In general, the relation between lateral tire
force and tire slip angle is nonlinear. In normal driving
conditions however, slip angles are kept in a small region
corresponding to stable driving. In this region, the lin-
ear model (2) provides a good approximation, Rajamani
(2006).
Remark 2. We note that ψ˙d in (1c) enters the system
equations as a disturbance. In an online application the
road curvature c(s), where s denotes distance along the
road ahead of the vehicle, might be obtained from a digital
map or through a vision system. Assuming s˙ ≈ vx, ψ˙d can
then be approximated through the relation ψ˙d = cvx.
2.2 Driver model
The threat assessment method proposed in this paper
utilizes a mathematical description of driver behavior.
In the literature, there’s a huge range of approaches to
driver modeling, see e.g. Cacciabue (2007). In the proposed
threat assessment algorithm we use a low complexity
model. The steering angle δ is computed as,
δ = Kyey +Kψe
lp
ψ ,
= Kyey +Kψeψ +Kψ∆ψd,
(4)
where elpψ is an orientation error, with respect to the
orientation of the road at time tlp ahead of the vehicle,
as illustrated in Figure 1. Ky, Kψ, and tlp are considered
as parameters of the driver model.
Remark 3. The driver model parameters Ky, Kψ, and
tlp are in general both driver and situation dependant
and might be estimated online in a vehicle application.
Estimation results of these parameters are demonstrated
in Falcone et al. (2010).
Remark 4. The disturbance ∆ψd, describes the road ge-
ometry and might in an online application be obtained
from data stored in a digital map. Alternatively, as noted
in Remark 2, the road curvature c(s), might be available
through a vision system. In such case, assuming constant
velocity, ∆ψd, can be computed as,
∆ψd =
∫ tlp
0
c(vxτ)vx dτ. (5)
2.3 Driver controlled vehicle model
We combine the models (1)-(4) and write the combined
vehicle and driver model in the following compact form,
x˙(t) = Ax(t) + Ew(t), (6)
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where x =
[
vy, ψ˙, eψ, ey
]T
is the state vector, w =[
ψ˙d, ∆ψd
]T
the disturbance vector, and the matrices A
and E are omitted due to lack of space.
2.4 System Constraints
Next we express the requirements that the vehicle stays
in the lane while operating in a stable operating region as
constraints on the vehicle state.
Let eyij , i ∈ {f, r}, j ∈ {l, r}, be the distances of the
four vehicle corners from the lane centerline. eyfr is shown
in Figure 1. Assuming small orientation error, eyij can be
written as
eyfl = ey +
c
2
+ aeψ, eyfr = ey −
c
2
+ aeψ, (7a)
eyrl = ey +
c
2
− beψ, eyrr = ey −
c
2
− beψ, (7b)
where c is the vehicle width, a and b are the distances
of the center of gravity from the front and rear vehicle
bumpers, respectively.
The requirement that the vehicle stays in the lane is then
expressed,
−eymax ≤ eyij ≤ eymax . (8)
Further, the requirement that the vehicle operates in stable
operating conditions is ensured by limiting the tire slip
angles αi, i ∈ {f, r} (see Remark 1),
αimin ≤ αi ≤ αimax . (9)
We recall that the tyre slip angles αi are affine functions
of the state vector x (see equations (3)-(4)), hence the
constraints (8)-(9) can be compactly written as,
Htx(t) ≤ ht. (10)
The constraints matrices Ht, ht are omitted due to lack
of space.
Remark 5. We observe that the constraints matrices
Ht, ht in (10) are situation dependant. Several of the
parameters in Ht, ht like e.g. eymax and ∆ψd might vary
over time.
3. THREAT ASSESSMENT AS A CONSTRAINT
SATISFACTION PROBLEM
In this section we formulate the threat assessment problem
as a Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP). At each time
instant, if the vehicle state does not satisfy the constraints
(10), the vehicle’s operation can be considered unsafe. The
threat assessment problem is therefore formulated as the
problem of evaluating whether the evolution of the vehicle
state over a future finite time horizon will satisfy a set of
predefined constraints.
Denote by,
(1) V = {z1, . . . , zn}, a set of numeric variables
(2) D = {Z1, . . . ,Zn}, a set of domains where Zi, a set
of numeric values, is the domain associated with the
variable zi,
(3) C(z) = {C1(z), . . . , Cm(z)}, a set of constraints where
a constraint Ci(z) is determined by a numeric relation
(equation, inequality, inclusion, etc.) linking a set of
variables under consideration.
We let CSP = (V,D, C(z)), denote a CSP and introduce
the following definition,
Definition 1. The solution of a CSP, solution(CSP =
(V,D, C(z))) is the set of numerical variables Σ for which
all the constraints Ci ∈ C can be satisfied i.e.,
Σ = {z ∈ Z |Ci(z) holds∀Ci ∈ C} (11)
The threat assessment CSP is formulated in discrete time,
the continuous time system (6) is therefore discretized with
a sampling time Ts to obtain the discrete time constrained
system,
x(k + 1) =Adx(k) + Edw(k) (12a)
subj. to
Hkx(k)≤ hk. (12b)
Assuming measurements of the state vector at time step k
available, the threat assessment CSP over a 1-step horizon
can now be stated as,
V = {x(k),x(k + 1), e(k)}
D = {Xk,Xk+1, Ek}
C = {Hk+1 x(k+1) ≤ hk+1
x(k+1) = Ad x(k) + Edw(k)
Hk x(k) ≤ hk
x˜(k) = x(k) + e(k)}.
(13)
Where x˜(k) is the measurement vector of the state vari-
ables, and e(k) represents the uncertainty associated with
the measurements. For each measurement, the uncertainty
is considered unknown but bounded, i.e. e(k) ∈ Ek.
The N -step threat assessment CSP can be formulated by
repetition of (13).
4. BACKGROUND ON INTERVAL TECHNIQUES
Several methods can be used to find the solution Σ to a
CSP (Definition 1). This section gives a brief introduction
to interval based consistency techniques, which have been
used in the results presented in this paper. Section 4.1
provides basic definitions in interval mathematics, which
are used in the interval techniques for CSPs in Section 4.2.
4.1 Basic interval mathematics
Interval mathematics is a generalization in which interval
numbers replace real numbers and interval arithmetic
replaces real arithmetic. The interval analysis, has been
introduced in Moore (1966).
Definition 2. A real interval [p] = [p, p] = {p | p ≤ p ≤ p}
is a connected and closed subset of R. Denote by IR the
set of all real intervals of R.
Definition 3. An interval real vector [z], also called a box,
is a subset of Rn and can be defined as the Cartesian
product of n intervals.
[z] = [z1] × [z2] × . . .× [zn] (14)
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Definition 4. If • denotes the classical operations {+,−,
∗, /} on real numbers p and q, i.e. addition, subtraction,
multiplication and division, respectively, then the opera-
tions associated with interval numbers [p] and [q] are
[p] • [q] = {p • q ∈ R | p ∈ [p], q ∈ [q]} (15)
Definition 5. The intersection of two intervals is defined
by
[p] ∩ [q] = {r ∈ R | r ∈ [p], r ∈ [q]} (16)
Definition 6. The union of two intervals is defined by
[p] ∪ [q] = {r ∈ R | r ∈ [p] or r ∈ [q]} (17)
Definition 7. The interval hull of the union of two intervals
[p]∪ [q], is denoted by [p]⊔ [q], and is the smallest interval
such that [p] ∪ [q] ⊆ [p] ⊔ [q].
Definition 8. Let f : Rn → Rm. Denote by, f([z]) =
{f(z) | z ∈ [z]}, the range of f over an interval vector [z].
Then an interval function [f ] : IRn → IRm, is an inclusion
function for f if,
∀[z] ∈ IRn , f([z]) ⊆ [f ]([z]). (18)
4.2 Interval techniques for constraint satisfaction problems
In interval-based consistency techniques, the solution to
a CSP, Σ, is approximated by one or several intervals
or boxes [z]i (Definitions 2 and 3). The solution, Σ, is
obtained by pruning the initial domain of the variables of
the CSP, through successive elimination of subboxes which
cannot contain the solution. The consistency techniques
most commonly used are known as Hull-consistency (also
called 2B-consistency) and Box-consistency, or are varia-
tions of them, Benhamou et al. (1999).
Hull-consistency algorithms decompose the original con-
straints into a set of primitive constraints, the constraints
are then enforced by interval arithmetic operations (Def-
initions 4-8). In general, wrapping of generic sets into
boxes, decomposition of constraints and use of interval
operations lead to overestimation of the solution Σ. In this
manuscript we utilize interval techniques which provide
an outer approximation Σˆ that is guaranteed to enclose
the true solution Σ. The choice of such techniques is com-
mented in Section 5. For a rigorous treatment of consis-
tency techniques for CSPs we refer the reader to Collavizza
et al. (1999); Jaulin et al. (2001).
5. INTERVAL-BASED THREAT ASSESSMENT
ALGORITHM
Denote by Wk = [wk,wk+1, . . . ,wk+N−1] a sequence of
disturbance samples over the horizon [k, k+N−1]. We
formulate an N -step threat assessment CSP and enforce
the constraints (12b), to hold for the system (12a), at
each time step over a finite time horizon of N steps.
An interval-based branch and prune algorithm is then
used to solve the threat assessment CSP. If the obtained
solution Σˆ is empty, a violation of the constraints (10)
can be expected within the horizon of N -steps and a flag
notSafe is set, activating an autonomous intervention or
warning. The threat assessment algorithm is outlined in
Algorithm 1.
Remark 6. The initiation of an autonomous intervention
in a situation where the driver is not in need of assistance
might be both dangerous and intrusive. It is therefore
Algorithm 1 Threat Assessment Algorithm
Input: Current state measurement x˜(k), sequence of dis-
turbances Wk, state update matrices (A
d, Ed), con-
straints matrices (Hk, . . . ,Hk+N−1, hk, . . . , hk+N−1)
Output: flag notSafe
1: notSafe = 0
2: V = { x(k), . . . ,x(k+N−1), e(k)}
3: D = { [x(k)], . . . , [x(k+N−1)], [e(k)]}
4:
C = { Hk+N−1x(k+N−1) ≤ hk+N−1
x(k+N−1) = Ad x(k+N−2) + Edw(k+N−2)
Hk+N−2x(k+N−2) ≤ hk+N−2
...
x(k+1) = Ad x(k) + Edw(k)
Hkx(k) ≤ hk
x˜(k) = x(k) + e(k)}
5: CSPTA = (V,D, C)
6: Σˆ = solution(CSPTA)
7: if Σˆ = ∅ then
8: notSafe = 1
9: end if
10: return flag notSafe
important that such an intervention is issued only once it
can be guaranteed that the driver is in need of assistance.
Since the interval based solver guarantees that Σ ⊆ Σˆ,
Σˆ = ∅ =⇒ Σ = ∅, hence, based on the model (12), a
violation of the constraints (10) can be guaranteed within
the horizon of N -steps.
6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Algorithm 1 has been validated off-line against experi-
mental data acquired on a test track. Measurements of
the state variables and disturbances were collected using
a differential GPS unit, a built-in high precision inertial
measurement unit and a digital map.
The vehicle and driver parameters used in the algorithm
are shown in Table 1, and the parameters of the constraints
on the vehicle position and slip angles are stated in
Table 2. Sampling time for measurements is taken as
Ts=0.01 s, and the prediction horizon N = 35 steps. As
noted in Remark 3, the driver model parameters might be
estimated recursively and updated online. In this paper
however, the driver model parameters shown in Table 1
have been estimated oﬄine on a batch of measurement
data.
Table 1. Vehicle and driver parameters
m [kg] Jz [kgm2] lf [m] lr [m]
1695 2617 1.14 1.50
a [m] b [m] c [m] Cf [kNm/rad]
1.83 2.69 1.77 54
tlp [s] Kψ [-] Ky [m
−1] Cr [kNm/rad]
0.82 -0.005 -0.002 45
Consider the situation shown in Figure 2, where the vehicle
enters a curve with a speed of approximately 84 km/h. We
observe that for such a narrow curve the vehicle speed
in this situation is too large. As seen in Figure 2, the
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Table 2. Parameters of the constraints on the
vehicle state
eymax [m] αfmin , αrmin [
◦] αfmax , αrmax [
◦]
1.56 -4 4
Fig. 2. Scenario where a vehicle is negotiating a curve. The
dashed line denotes the vehicle trajectory. The circles
denote the vehicle positions 1 and 2, respectively.
The solid lines originating from the circles denote the
horizon of N -steps.
vehicle crosses the outer lane marking, and thus violates
the constraints (10), at position V .
In Figure 3, we show the output of Algorithm 1, i.e. the
flag notSafe, for the situation in Figure 2. The results in
Figure 3(a) have been computed assuming no uncertainty
in the measurements of the state vector, i.e. we have set
[e(k)] = [0, 0]4. Denote by kv, the time instant when
the vehicle is in position V . Recall that, a constraint
violation occurs at position V , hence a “nominal” flag
notSafenom would be raisedN−1 steps earlier, i.e. at time
ka = kv −N + 1 . This is illustrated with a dashed line in
Figure 3. The solid line shows notSafe obtained through
Algorithm 1. The vertical dash-dot lines in Figure 3(a)
are placed at the time instants kv, ka and k1, where k1
denotes the time instant when the vehicle is in position
1 in Figure 2. We note that the flag notSafe computed
through Algorithm 1 is raised already at k1, which is too
early compared to the nominal flag.
In the results shown in Figure 3(b), on the other hand,
we have accounted for uncertainty in the measurements
by setting,
[e(k)] = [e1(k)]× [e2(k)]× [e3(k)]× [e4(k)],
ei(k) = [−0.02|x˜i(k)|, 0.02|x˜i(k)|] , i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
(19)
where x˜i(k) denotes the i-th component of the measured
state vector x˜(k). We note that in this case, the flag
notSafe is instead set at the time instant k2, i.e. the
time instant when the vehicle is in position 2 in Figure 2.
Compared to the nominal flag notSafenom which is set
at ka, the flag notSafe computed through Algorithm 1
is here delayed 8 samples. By accounting for measurement
uncertainties we managed, in this case, to remove the early
intervention at k1. The cost for the robustness against
measurement errors is however in this case a small delay.
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k1 k2
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Fig. 3. Output of the proposed algorithm, the solid line de-
notes the flag notSafe and the dashed line denotes the
flag notSafenom. In (a) no measurement uncertainty
is considered, while in (b) measurements uncertainty
according to (19) is considered.
In Figures 4, 5, we illustrate how the measurement un-
certainty influences the threat assessment CSP. The se-
quences of boxes illustrate the predicted evolution of the
state vector over the horizon of N -steps. The black boxes
denote the set of possible values of the state vector at time
step k, i.e. {x(k) ∈ R4|x(k) = x˜(k)− e(k), e(k) ∈ [e(k)]},
while the boxes are gradually brighter further along the
horizon. [e(k)] has been set according to (19). The dashed
line illustrates the boundary of the constraints sets (10)
at time step k + N − 1. We remark however that the
illustrations in Figures 4, 5 are in 2-dimensions while
the illustrated sets are of higher dimension. The sets in
Figures 4, 5, are cuts at measured values of components
of the state vector. In e.g. Figure 5, the black box thus
denotes,
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Fig. 4. The dashed line illustrates the boundary of the
constraint set (10). The boxes denote the evolution
of the vehicle states over the horizon of N -steps. The
black box denotes the possible vehicle state at time k1
while the boxes are gradually brighter further along
the horizon.
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Fig. 5. The same color convention as in Figure 4 has been
adopted, the evolution of the vehicle state starts at
time k2.
{[x(k2)]
⋂{
x ∈ R4 :
[
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
]
x =
[
x˜1(k2)
x˜2(k2)
]}
}.
We note that in Figure 5, the white box denoting the set of
possible vehicle states at the end of the prediction horizon
is disjoint with the constraint set (10), while this is not
the case in Figure 4. We also observe that according to
the prediction shown in Figure 5, the vehicle is expected
to violate the constraint eyfl ≤ eymax in particular. This
is in fact confirmed in Figure 2 where we observe that the
front left corner of the vehicle is the first to cross the lane
marking at time step kv.
7. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
We have presented a model based threat assessment algo-
rithm for driver assistance systems. The threat assessment
problem has been formulated as a constraint satisfaction
problem, solved through interval-based methods. The ex-
perimental results shown in this paper demonstrate the
proposed methods ability to predict unsafe situations,
despite uncertainties in the available measurements. How-
ever, we remark that extensive testing in a larger range
of conditions need to be conducted and that the adopted
vehicle and driver models might not be sufficient in all
operating conditions. The promising results obtained with
such simple models however motivates (i) further inves-
tigation with nonlinear models and constraints and (ii)
accounting for uncertainties in the model parameters, in
these cases the interval-based techniques are particularly
beneficial.
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